EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002 (Apr. 25, 2012), V.B.1-5. Job Related and Consistent with Business Necessity: Arrests, Convictions and Validation

Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · Current as of: Issued April 25, 2012 · official source

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B. Job Related For the Position in Question and Consistent with Business Necessity

1. Generally

After the plaintiff in litigation establishes disparate impact, Title VII shifts the burdens of production and persuasion to the employer to “demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”[81] In the legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress referred to Griggs and its progeny such as Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody[82] and Dothard[83] to explain how this standard should be construed.[84] The Griggs Court stated that the employer’s burden was to show that the policy or practice is one that “bear[s] a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used” and “measures the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.”[85] In both Albemarle[86] and Dothard,[87] the Court emphasized the factual nature of the business necessity inquiry. The Court further stated in Dothard that the terms of the exclusionary policy must “be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance.”[88]

In a case involving a criminal record exclusion, the Eighth Circuit in its 1975 Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad decision, held that it was discriminatory under Title VII for an employer to “follow[] the policy of disqualifying for employment any applicant with a conviction for any crime other than a minor traffic offense.”[89] The Eighth Circuit identified three factors (the “Green factors”) that were relevant to assessing whether an exclusion is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity:

• The nature and gravity of the offense or conduct;[90]

• The time that has passed since the offense or conduct and/or completion of the sentence;[91] and

• The nature of the job held or sought.[92]

In 2007, the Third Circuit in El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority[93] developed the statutory analysis in greater depth. Douglas El challenged SEPTA’s policy of excluding everyone ever convicted of a violent crime from the job of paratransit driver.[94] El, a

55 year-old African American paratransit driver-trainee, was terminated from employment when

SEPTA learned of his conviction for second-degree murder 40 years earlier; the conviction involved a gang fight when he was 15 years old and was his only disqualifying offense under SEPTA’s policy.[95] The Third Circuit expressed “reservations” about a policy such as SEPTA’s

(exclusion for all violent crimes, no matter how long ago they were committed) “in the abstract.”[96]

Applying Supreme Court precedent, the El court observed that some level of risk is inevitable in all hiring, and that, “[i]n a broad sense, hiring policies . . . ultimately concern the management of risk.”[97] Recognizing that assessing such risk is at the heart of criminal record exclusions, the Third Circuit concluded that Title VII requires employers to justify criminal record exclusions by demonstrating that they “accurately distinguish between applicants [who] pose an unacceptable level of risk and those [who] do not.”[98]

The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for SEPTA, but stated that the outcome of the case might have been different if Mr. El had, “for example, hired an expert who testified that there is a time at which a former criminal is no longer any more likely to recidivate than the average person, . . . [so] there would be a factual question for the jury to resolve.”[99] The Third

Circuit reasoned, however, that the recidivism evidence presented by SEPTA’s experts, in conjunction with the nature of the position at issue—paratransit driver-trainee with unsupervised access to vulnerable adults—required the employer to exercise the utmost care.[100]

In the subsections below, the Commission discusses considerations that are relevant to assessing whether criminal record exclusion policies or practices are job related and consistent with business necessity. First, we emphasize that arrests and convictions are treated differently.

2. Arrests

The fact of an arrest does not establish that criminal conduct has occurred.[101] Arrests are not proof of criminal conduct. Many arrests do not result in criminal charges, or the charges are dismissed.[102] Even if an individual is charged and subsequently prosecuted, he is presumed innocent unless proven guilty.[103]

An arrest, however, may in some circumstances trigger an inquiry into whether the conduct underlying the arrest justifies an adverse employment action. Title VII calls for a fact-based analysis to determine if an exclusionary policy or practice is job related and consistent with business necessity. Therefore, an exclusion based on an arrest, in itself, is not job related and consistent with business necessity.

Another reason for employers not to rely on arrest records is that they may not report the final disposition of the arrest (e.g., not prosecuted, convicted, or acquitted). As documented in Section III.A., supra, the DOJ/BJS reported that many arrest records in the FBI’s III database and state criminal record repositories are not associated with final dispositions.[104] Arrest records also may include inaccuracies or may continue to be reported even if expunged or sealed.[105]

Example 3: Arrest Record Is Not Grounds for Exclusion. Mervin and Karen, a middle-aged African American couple, are driving to church in a predominantly white town. An officer stops them and interrogates them about their destination. When Mervin becomes annoyed and comments that his offense is simply “driving while Black,” the officer arrests him for disorderly conduct. The prosecutor decides not to file charges against Mervin, but the arrest remains in the police department’s database and is reported in a background check when Mervin applies with his employer of fifteen years for a promotion to an executive position. The employer’s practice is to deny such promotions to individuals with arrest records, even without a conviction, because it views an arrest record as an indicator of untrustworthiness and irresponsibility. If Mervin filed a Title VII charge based on these facts, and disparate impact based on race were established, the EEOC would find reasonable cause to believe that his employer violated Title VII.

Although an arrest record standing alone may not be used to deny an employment opportunity, an employer may make an employment decision based on the conduct underlying the arrest if the conduct makes the individual unfit for the position in question. The conduct, not the arrest, is relevant for employment purposes.

Example 4: Employer's Inquiry into Conduct Underlying Arrest. Andrew, a Latino man, worked as an assistant principal in Elementary School for several years. After several ten and eleven-year-old girls attending the school accused him of touching them inappropriately on the chest, Andrew was arrested and charged with several counts of endangering the welfare of children and sexual abuse. Elementary School has a policy that requires suspension or termination of any employee who the school believes engaged in conduct that impacts the health or safety of the students. After learning of the accusations, the school immediately places Andrew on unpaid administrative leave pending an investigation. In the course of its investigation, the school provides Andrew a chance to explain the events and circumstances that led to his arrest. Andrew denies the allegations, saying that he may have brushed up against the girls in the crowded hallways or lunchroom, but that he doesn’t really remember the incidents and does not have regular contact with any of the girls. The school also talks with the girls, and several of them recount touching in crowded situations. The school does not find Andrew’s explanation credible. Based on Andrew’s conduct, the school terminates his employment pursuant to its policy.

Andrew challenges the policy as discriminatory under Title VII. He asserts that it has a disparate impact based on national origin and that his employer may not suspend or terminate him based solely on an arrest without a conviction because he is innocent until proven guilty. After confirming that an arrest policy would have a disparate impact based on national origin, the EEOC concludes that no discrimination occurred. The school’s policy is linked to conduct that is relevant to the particular jobs at issue, and the exclusion is made based on descriptions of the underlying conduct, not the fact of the arrest. The Commission finds no reasonable cause to believe Title VII was violated.

3. Convictions

By contrast, a record of a conviction will usually serve as sufficient evidence that a person engaged in particular conduct, given the procedural safeguards associated with trials and guilty pleas.[106] However, there may be evidence of an error in the record, an outdated record, or another reason for not relying on the evidence of a conviction. For example, a database may continue to report a conviction that was later expunged, or may continue to report as a felony an offense that was subsequently downgraded to a misdemeanor.[107]

Some states require employers to wait until late in the selection process to ask about convictions.[108] The policy rationale is that an employer is more likely to objectively assess the relevance of an applicant’s conviction if it becomes known when the employer is already knowledgeable about the applicant’s qualifications and experience.[109] As a best practice, and consistent with applicable laws,[110] the Commission recommends that employers not ask about convictions on job applications and that, if and when they make such inquiries, the inquiries be limited to convictions for which exclusion would be job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.

4. Determining Whether a Criminal Conduct Exclusion Is Job Related and Consistent with Business Necessity

To establish that a criminal conduct exclusion that has a disparate impact is job related and consistent with business necessity under Title VII, the employer needs to show that the policy operates to effectively link specific criminal conduct, and its dangers, with the risks inherent in the duties of a particular position.

Two circumstances in which the Commission believes employers will consistently meet the “job related and consistent with business necessity” defense are as follows: o The employer validates the criminal conduct screen for the position in question per the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (Uniform Guidelines) standards (if data about criminal conduct as related to subsequent work performance is available and such validation is possible);[111] or o The employer develops a targeted screen considering at least the nature of the crime, the time elapsed, and the nature of the job (the three Green factors), and then provides an opportunity for an individualized assessment for people excluded by the screen to determine whether the policy as applied is job related and consistent with business necessity.

The individualized assessment would consist of notice to the individual that he has been screened out because of a criminal conviction; an opportunity for the individual to demonstrate that the exclusion should not be applied due to his particular circumstances; and consideration by the employer as to whether the additional information provided by the individual warrants an exception to the exclusion and shows that the policy as applied is not job related and consistent with business necessity. See Section V.B.9, infra (examples of relevant considerations in individualized assessments).

Depending on the facts and circumstances, an employer may be able to justify a targeted criminal records screen solely under the Green factors. Such a screen would need to be narrowly tailored to identify criminal conduct with a demonstrably tight nexus to the position in question. Title VII thus does not necessarily require individualized assessment in all circumstances. However, the use of individualized assessments can help employers avoid Title VII liability by allowing them to consider more complete information on individual applicants or employees, as part of a policy that is job related and consistent with business necessity.

5. Validation

The Uniform Guidelines describe three different approaches to validating employment screens.[112] However, they recognize that “[t]here are circumstances in which a user cannot or need not utilize” formal validation techniques and that in such circumstances an employer

“should utilize selection procedures which are as job related as possible and which will minimize or eliminate adverse impact as set forth [in the following subsections].”[113] Although there may be social science studies that assess whether convictions are linked to future behaviors, traits, or conduct with workplace ramifications,[114] and thereby provide a framework for validating some employment exclusions, such studies are rare at the time of this drafting.

Footnotes

[81] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (defining the term “demonstrates” to mean “meets the burdens of production and persuasion”).

[82] 422 U.S. 405 (1975).

[83] 433 U.S. 321 (1977).

[84] 137 CONG. REC. 15273 (1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth) (“[T]he terms ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ are intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co, and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.” (citations omitted)). Section 105(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that only the interpretive memorandum read by Senator Danforth in the Congressional Record may be considered legislative history or relied upon in construing or applying the business necessity standard.

[85] 401 U.S. at 431, 436.

[86] 422 U.S. at 430–31 (endorsing the EEOC’s position that discriminatory tests are impermissible unless shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to predict or correlate with “‘important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated’” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c))).

[87] 433 U.S. at 331–32 (concluding that using height and weight as proxies for strength did not satisfy the business necessity defense because the employer failed to establish a correlation between height and weight and the necessary strength, and also did not specify the amount of strength necessary to perform the job safely and efficiently).

[88] Id. at 331 n.14.

[89] 523 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1975). “In response to a question on an application form, Green [a 29-year-old African American man] disclosed that he had been convicted in December 1967 for refusing military induction. He stated that he had served 21 months in prison until paroled on July 24, 1970.” Id. at 1292–93.

[90] Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 549 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th Cir. 1977) (upholding the district court’s injunction prohibiting the employer from using an applicant’s conviction record as an absolute bar to employment but allowing it to consider a prior criminal record as a factor in making individual hiring decisions, as long as the defendant took these three factors into account).

[91] Id. (referring to completion of the sentence rather than completion of parole).

[92] Id.

[93] 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007).

[94] Id. at 235.

[95] Id. at 235, 236.

[96] Id. at 235.

[97] Id. at 244.

[98] Id. at 244–45.

[99] Id. at 247. Cf. Shawn Bushway et al., The Predictive Value of Criminal Background Checks: Do Age and Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 52 (2011) [hereinafter The Predictive Value of Criminal Background Checks] (“Given the results of the current as well as previous [recidivism] studies, the 40-year period put forward in El v. SEPTA (2007) . . . seems too old of a score to be still in need of settlement.”).

[100] El, 479 F.3d at 248.

[101] Some states have enacted laws to limit employer inquiries concerning all or some arrest records. See BACKGROUND CHECKS, supra note 25, at 48–49. At least 13 states have statutes explicitly prohibiting arrest record inquiries and/or dissemination subject to certain exceptions. See, e.g., Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.160(b)(8)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1009(c)); California (CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(a)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-80(e)); Illinois (775 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-103(A)) (dealing with arrest records that have been ordered expunged, sealed, or impounded); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 4(9)); Michigan (MICH COMP. LAWS § 37.2205a(1) (applying to misdemeanor arrests only)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3523(2)) (ordering no dissemination of arrest records under certain conditions and specified time periods)); New York (N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(16)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-60-16.6(2)); Pennsylvania (18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9121(b)(2)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(7)), and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. §§ 111.321, 111.335a).

[102] See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (discussing federal prosecutors’ broad discretionary authority to determine whether to prosecute cases and whether to bring charges before a grand jury); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (explaining same for state prosecutors); see also THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, at 10, Table 11 (2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf (reporting that in the 75 largest counties in the country, nearly one-third of the felony arrests did not result in a conviction because the charges against the defendants were dismissed).

[103] Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957) (“The mere fact that a [person] has been arrested has very little, if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct.”); United States. v. Hynes, 467 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding a preliminary jury instruction that stated that a “defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty. The indictment against the Defendant is only an accusation, nothing more. It’s not proof of guilt or anything else.”); see Gregory v. Litton Sys. Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (“[I]nformation concerning a prospective employee’s record of arrests without convictions, is irrelevant to [an applicant’s] suitability or qualification for employment.”), modified on other grounds, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972); Dozier v. Chupka, 395 F. Supp. 836, 850 n.10 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (stating that the use of arrest records was too crude a predictor of an employee’s predilection for theft where there were no procedural safeguards to prevent reliance on unwarranted arrests); City of Cairo v. Ill. Fair Empl. Prac. Comm., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) & 9682 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (concluding that, where applicants sought to become police officers, they could not be absolutely barred from appointment solely because they had been arrested, as distinguished from convicted); see also EEOC Dec. 74-83, ¶ 6424 (CCH) (1983) (finding no business justification for an employer’s unconditional termination of all employees with arrest records (all five employees terminated were Black), purportedly to reduce thefts in the workplace; the employer produced no evidence that these particular employees had been involved in any of the thefts, or that all people who are arrested but not convicted are prone towards crime in the future); EEOC Dec. 76-87, ¶ 6665 (CCH) (1983) (holding that an applicant who sought to become a police officer could not be rejected based on one arrest five years earlier for riding in a stolen car when he asserted that he did not know that the car was stolen and the charge was dismissed).

[104] See STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 37, at 2; see also BACKGROUND CHECKS, supra note 25, at 17.

[105] See supra notes 39–40.

[106] See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 766 (2006) (“The first presumption [in a criminal case] is that a defendant is innocent unless and until the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense charged. . . .”). See also FED. R. CRIM P 11 (criminal procedure rule governing pleas). The Supreme Court has concluded that criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. See generally Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).

[107] See supra text accompanying note 39.

[108] See e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5(b). Under this provision, the employer may withdraw the offer of employment if the prospective employee has a conviction record “that bears a rational relationship to the duties and responsibilities of the position.” Id. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-80(b) (“[N]o employer . . . shall inquire about a prospective employee’s past convictions until such prospective employee has been deemed otherwise qualified for the position.”); MINN. STAT. § 364.021(a) (“[A] public employer may not inquire or consider the criminal record or criminal history of an applicant for public employment until the applicant has been selected for an interview by the employer.”). State fair employment practices agencies have information about applicable state law.

[109] See generally NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES & NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, CITIES PAVE THE WAY: PROMISING REENTRY POLICIES THAT PROMOTE LOCAL HIRING OF PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS (2010), www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2010/CitiesPavetheWay.pdf?nocdn=1 (identifying local initiatives that address ways to increase employment opportunities for individuals with criminal records, including delaying a background check until the final stages of the hiring process, leveraging development funds, and expanding bid incentive programs to promote local hiring priorities); NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, CITY AND COUNTY HIRING INITIATIVES (2010), www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/CityandCountyHiringInitiatives.pdf (discussing the various city and county initiatives that have removed questions regarding criminal history from the job application and have waited until after a conditional offer of employment has been made to conduct a background check and inquire about the applicant’s criminal background).

[110] Several federal laws automatically prohibit employing individuals with certain felony convictions or, in some cases, misdemeanor convictions. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7371(b) (requiring the mandatory removal of any federal law enforcement officer who is convicted of a felony); 46 U.S.C. § 70105(c)(1)(A) (mandating that individuals who have been convicted of espionage, sedition, treason or terrorism be permanently disqualified from receiving a biometric transportation security card and thereby excluded from port work employment); 42 U.S.C. § 13726(b)(1) (disqualifying persons with felony convictions or domestic violence convictions from working for a private prisoner transport company); 25 U.S.C. § 3207(b) (prohibiting individuals with a felony conviction, or any of two or more misdemeanor convictions, from working with Indian children if their convictions involved crimes of violence, sexual assault, molestation, exploitation, contact or prostitution, crimes against persons, or offenses committed against children); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (9) (prohibiting an individual convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor for domestic violence from possessing a firearm, thereby excluding such individual from a wide range of jobs that require such possession); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (prohibiting individuals convicted of treason from “holding any office under the United States”). Other federal laws prohibit employing individuals with certain convictions for a defined time period. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7313(a) (prohibiting individuals convicted of a felony for inciting a riot or civil disorder from holding any position in the federal government for five years after the date of the conviction); 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (requiring a ten-year ban on employing individuals in banks if they have certain financial-related convictions); 49 U.S.C. § 44936(b)(1)(B) (imposing a ten-year ban on employing an individual as a security screener for an air carrier if that individuals has been convicted of specified crimes).

[111] See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (describing the general standards for validity studies).

[112] Id.

[113] Id. § 1607.6B. The following subsections state: (1) Where informal or unscored procedures are used. When an informal or unscored selection procedure which has an adverse impact is utilized, the user should eliminate the adverse impact, or modify the procedure to one which is a formal, scored or quantified measure or combination of measures and then validate the procedure in accord with these guidelines, or otherwise justify continued use of the procedure in accord with Federal law. (2) Where formal and scored procedures are used. When a formal and scored selection procedure is used which has an adverse impact, the validation techniques contemplated by these guidelines usually should be followed if technically feasible. Where the user cannot or need not follow the validation techniques anticipated by these guidelines, the user should either modify the procedure to eliminate adverse impact or otherwise justify continued use of the procedure in accord with Federal law. Id. § 1607.6A, B(1)–(2).

[114] See, e.g., Brent W. Roberts et al., Predicting the Counterproductive Employee in a Child-to-Adult Prospective Study, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1427, 1430 (2007), http://internal.psychology.illinois.edu/~broberts/Roberts,%20Harms,%20Caspi,%20&%20Moffit t,%202007.pdf (finding that in a study of New Zealand residents from birth to age 26, “[a]dolescent criminal convictions were unrelated to committing counterproductive activities at work [such as tardiness, absenteeism, disciplinary problems, etc.]. In fact, according to the [results of the study], people with an adolescent criminal conviction record were less likely to get in a fight with their supervisor or steal things from work.”).

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